Right-wing Terrorism in Europe: The current trends and elements.

 

En este enlace se puede leer el artículo traducido al español: terrorismo de extrema derecha. Tendencias y elementos

 

Abstract

Right-wing violence in Europe is not new, however, in the last decade a revival of militant right-wing extremist groups, networks, and incidents have occurred. Since 2012 xenophobic and racist incidents have increased in almost all European countries, Europe is experiencing a new wave of violent far-right radicalisation. This increase of incidents come along with a surge of anti-immigration and Islamophobic violence, as well as: anti-government attacks, assaults on political opponents, ethnic minorities, and homosexuals. Nevertheless, there is an issue: right-wing terrorist attacks are seen mostly as isolated events; one of the many problematics in the study of Right-wing Terrorism (RWT) is that such attacks have been classified as hate crimes instead of terrorism. The main question for this paper deals with the issue of profiling the individuals that carry out RWT; likewise, the purpose of this paper is to present the current trends and elements of RWT by doing a revision on the key elements in order to attempt to make a profiling of such individuals.

Keywords: Right-wing Terrorism; radicalization; Extremism; Hate Crime

 

1.Introduction

The threat of RWT has been present in the government’s agenda this decade, however only a relatively small number of academic studies have thus far focused on this form of political violence. In perspective, the last decade Europe has seen an increase of electoral successes for nationalist and far-right parties; such parties like the National Front in France, VOX in Spain, Sweden Democrats, Golden Dawn in Greece, Law and Justice in Poland, Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and the Danish People’s Party, are just some examples of how the Far-Right agenda has entered into the European political scene, and in 2018 three different plots were stopped in Europe: two assassination plans (one to kill Pedro Sánchez and, the other to kill Emmanuel Macron[1] [2]) and, a potential terrorist attack in London[3].

As a result of the ongoing refugee crisis and the Jihadist motivated terrorist attacks (among other factors), Far-right parties have gained support, this can be linked with the peaks of RWT and Hate Crimes.[4] An example of this is that after the Paris Terror attacks in 2015, the National Front got its highest ever results in local elections, almost 30% of the national vote[5]; and while they lost the national election, the presence is still there. Another element to be taken into account is the violence against the Muslim population after such events, after the London bombings in 2005, police reported a six-fold increase in the rate of right-wing violence against Muslims, and in France in 2015 incidents rose by 281 percent.[6] In addition, some studies show a significant rise in right-wing-motivated arsonist attacks following verbal shifts in the political debate towards more xenophobic language.[7]

Therefore, here is presented the first debate on RWT, until what point a violent incident (inspired by the far-right ideology) can be considered hate crime instead of terrorism. One of the most problematic issues related into the identification and adequately classification of right-wing terrorism is the conceptualization used to describe this form of political violence; many incidents of right-wing terrorism have been labelled or classified as hate crimes rather than terrorist incidents.[8] [9]

In recent years the tendencies in Europe in politics have become less stable and unpredictable; the negative attitudes towards immigration have become discordant, in addition other events within the European Union such as Brexit add uncertainty. Meanwhile, national agendas are increasingly becoming defined by a securitisation agenda focused on tackling religion-based extremism. In this context, many varieties of non-mainstream Ethno-centrist and nationalist ideas from nationalist parties have found fertile territory for growth.[10] [11] [12]

To be able to explain the new elements and trends of RWT a definition of terrorism will be presented and debated; then the elements of RWT and hate crimes will be exposed in order to present a definition that encompasses the elements of RWT and presents a clear distinction with hate crimes. In addition, a brief exposition of spectrum of political violence will be given in order to explain the process of radicalization in RWT and their major ideological elements. Followingly, the current trends of RWT and the element of the lone wolf will be analysed (since this has been the major change in RWT in this decade), all of this in the attempt to present the profile of the right-wing terrorist.

 

2.One terrorism or many terrorisms?

Defining terrorism has been a problem since there is not a universally accepted definition, this is explained because each definition fulfils the purpose of those who provide it. The U.S. Department of State (DOS) formulated one of the most widely accepted definition of terrorism, in their definition -terrorism is-: “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”[13] In this definition, the term non-combatant includes civilians and unarmed or off-duty military personnel. The National Research Council provides another commonly used definition: “illegal use or threatened use of force or violence, with an intent to coerce societies or governments by inducing fear in their populations, typically with political and /or ideological motives and justifications and, an ‘extra-societal’ element, either ‘outside’ society in the case of domestic terrorism or ‘foreign’ in the case of international terrorism”.[14]

Alex Schimd, advocates that: “if the core of war crimes—deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage taking and the killing of prisoners—is extended to peacetime, we could simply define acts of terrorism as ‘peacetime equivalents of war crimes”[15]; another definition by Boaz Ganor, who defines terrorism as: “a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve political goals”.[16] The last definition is useful since it differentiates the use of deliberate targeting of civilians in order to achieve political objectives, which is what distinguishes a terrorist act from other types of political violence.

For this paper the definition by Wardlaw is most useful: “Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators”.[17] Here the main focus I want to make is in that for this paper terrorism is a premeditated act to induce fear.

 

3.Right-wing terrorism or hate crime?

Once the definition of terrorism -and the focus on the element of premeditation and fear- has been presented, the RWT elements will be exposed and a differentiation with hate crimes will be done. The argument proposed is that the main differences between them are: 1) planification and 2) purpose. I propose that hate crimes come before terrorism, and serves as a bridge and as an ideological testing phase; once the individual or group has committed a violent act, he/they are motivated to scale the violence, thus planning and premeditating an attack in order to induce fear, which then can be considered terrorism; and as Mark Hamm points out, right-wing political violence can, in fact, be both hate crime and terrorism.[18] This proposition is based upon the Ravndal and Bjorgo’s considerations on RWT. [19]

Right-wing terrorism refers to the use of terrorist violence by right-wing groups. The purpose of right-wing terrorist organisations is to change the entire political, social and economic system on an extremist right-wing model, taking supremacism, or the idea that a certain group of people sharing a common element (nation, race, culture) is superior to all other people as one of its core values.[20] Because they see themselves in a supreme position, they consider it is their natural right to rule over the rest of the population; therefore, racist behaviour, authoritarianism, xenophobia and hostility to immigration are commonly found attitudes in right-wing extremists; variants of right- wing extremist groups are the neo- Nazi, neo-fascist and ultra-nationalist formations. [21] [22]

According to Daniel Koehler, right-wing terrorism is a unique form of political violence with fluid boundaries between hate crime and organized terrorism; which in general does not aim for individual and concentrated high-effect results, but rather for long-term, low-intensity “warfare” against their enemies.[23]

A common characteristic of RWT is the lack of public communication in regard of the attacks, and that the use of terrorism by right-wing extremists is a natural consequence of extreme-right ideologies. Therefore, claiming responsibility through letters, statements, and communiques are not done.[24] Another element is that RWT has operated both traditionally and tactically using small groups, cells, and lone-actors to target government representatives and minorities with explosives and targeted assassinations.[25] [26]

A hate crime by comparison is defined as: “a criminal act that is motivated by a bias toward the victim or victims real or perceived identity group- which- can include, for example, the desire to intimidate on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation, or other grounds”. [27] [28] The key difference is the lack of planning in the attacks, a hate crime is a spontaneous act, it is not planned and it is not done in order to induce fear.[29]

 

4.The spectrum of Political Violence in far-right: Radicalization and Political Extremism, similar but not the same.

Studies show that Europe has experienced a new wave of violent far-right radicalisation, which has led to a heightened risk of individuals and groups into developing terrorist acts. [30]However, there’s a common misconception that radicals are violent, radicals then are not per se violent and while they might share certain characteristics with extremists, there are also important differences, and even then, not all extremists are terrorists. The main differentiation is that radicals accept diversity and believe in the power of reason rather than dogma, and extremists don’t.[31] [32] Radicalism is redeemable, de-radicalization is possible, however, I argue that extremists can’t be redeemed.

According to Schuurman and Taylor, the conceptualization of radicalization and political extremism have come to dominate debates on the processes leading to involvement in terrorism, they argue that radicalization is still too often perceived of as a process in which the adoption of radical beliefs precedes and leads to participation in terrorist violence.[33] They argue that radicalism, extremism and terrorism are distinct concepts that are not causally linked to one another; and claim that demonstrated that the majority of radical individuals never turn their convictions into violent acts and that even actual terrorists are not necessarily or primarily motivated by their extremist beliefs.[34]

There are many definitions of radicalization, for instance, Doosje et all define radicalization as: “a process through which individuals become increasingly motivated to use violent means against members of an out-group or symbolic targets to achieve change and political goals.”[35] Following this definition, this process has three phases: Phase 1 is characterized by a sensitivity to a radical ideology. In Phase 2, an individual becomes a member of a radical group. Finally, in Phase 3, this person is ready to act on behalf of the group’s ideology, for example by planning an attack. Typically processes of radicalisation take time, and attacks are usually not ‘spontaneous’.[36]

Another definition by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service is: “a process, by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective.”[37] And the one of the Swedish Security Service which defines radicalization as both: “a process that leads to ideological or religious activism to introduce radical change to society’ and a ‘process that leads to an individual or group using, promoting or advocating violence for political aims.”[38] In most of the definitions, there’s an agreement on the process element and the motivation to use violence in order to reach a goal; there are many forms of violence other than terrorism, a hate crime for instance.

In contrast, political extremism by definition is: “the will to power by a social movement in the service of a political program typically at variance with that supported by existing state authorities, and for which individual liberties are to be curtailed in the name of collective goals, including the mass murder of those who would actually or potentially disagree with that program.” [39]

What Extremists strive to create is a homogeneous society based on rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets; they seek to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and subjugating minorities.[40] The elements that characterize extremists are: 1)Anti-constitutional, anti-democratic, anti-pluralist, authoritarian; 2) Fanatical, intolerant, non-compromising, single-minded black-or-white thinkers; 3) Rejecting the rule of law while adhering to an ends-justify-means philosophy; 4) Aiming to realise their goals by any means, including, when the opportunity offers itself, the use of massive political violence against opponents. In the case of Right-wing terrorism, the most prominent ideologies are neo-fascism, neo-Nazism and white nationalism.[41] [42]

Combinations of long-term factors, such as previous criminality and mental health issues, and short-term factors, such as losing a job or experiencing a relationship breakdown, typically (though not always) explain why people become vulnerable to forms of far-right radicalisation.[43] Exposure to ideology is also crucial to far-right radicalisation, while personal grievances are often blended into the world views of far-right terrorists, helping to legitimise action.[44] The inclusion of an ideological component distinguishes lone actor terrorists from others who kill, such as serial killers; exposure to, and interest in, a highly idiosyncratic and personalised far-right ideology is only one part of what can be identified as being crucial to producing far-right lone actor terrorists.[45] In addition, the increased role of the internet in contemporary forms of far-right radicalisation is crucial, especially as a tool for self-directed radicalisation, providing attackers with inspirational ideological material, information on how to develop methods of attack, and opportunities to tell others about their actions.[46]

 

5.The current trends on Right-Wing Terrorism: actors, elements and profiles.

The past ten years have shown a steady increase in the number of terrorist attacks in Europe. A study by Jacob Aasland in 20016 presented a Dataset covering RWT in Western Europe from 1990 to 2015; and in its findings it showed that:

• The premeditated attacks that have been carried out have been predominantly by gangs (117 incidents) or lone actors (96 incidents), and less frequently by organized groups (30 incidents) or their affiliated members (37 incidents).[47]

• The spontaneous attacks are mainly carried out by gangs (40 incidents), unorganized groups (34 incidents), and lone actors (25 incidents), also it showed that the majority of killings had been committed by gangs, unorganized groups, and lone actors – and not by organized militants. [48]

• The victims, two groups stand out as these are by far most frequently targeted: immigrants (249 incidents) and leftists (138 incidents). Other significant target groups include Muslims (28 incidents), government representatives (25 incidents), homeless people (25 incidents), and homosexuals (23 incidents).[49]

• The way they carry out the attacks, the dataset shows that often resort to knives (119 incidents), unarmed beating and kicking (108 incidents), explosives (86 incidents), firearms (85 incidents), and blunt instruments such as iron bars, bats, or wooden sticks (68 incidents). In addition, firebombs (38 attacks) and arson (20 attacks) have also been frequently used. [50]

In sum the key elements to be found are: the majority of attacks and killings have been committed by unorganized gangs and lone actors; they target mostly immigrants and; they resort to knives and beatings rather than firebombs and firearms, and most of the incidents were premeditated.

In the categorization of Right-wing terrorists Pantucci proposes three categories: 1) loners, who have vicarious relationships with wider far-right cultures and, have little to no two-way interaction with wider far-right communities and are almost entirely self-radicalised; 2) lone actors, who have long-lasting, two-way relationships with far-right cultures and much more engaged set of interactions with far-right organisations (a characteristic element of the lone actors is the personalization of their attacks); finally, 3) small groups, clusters of activists who develop into self-directed, autonomous cells. [51] [52]

Researchers agree that lone-wolf terrorism is on the increase, facilitated by the increased availability of information on the internet[53]; lone actors find radicalising material and guidance for conducting and preparing attacks on the internet.[54][55] Regarding the use of the “lone wolf”, the use of this term by the media been considered uncritical and misleading. The myth that there are activists with no relationship with larger political movements, creating the idea that such activists are undetectable is the first challenge in the countermeasures to be taken. David Wilson argues that: “Lone–actor terrorists regularly engaged in a detectable and observable range of activities, with a wider group, social movement, or terrorist organisation.”[56]

In the categorization of the “lone wolfs”, which are those who manifest -or appear to manifest- little to no two-way contact with other far-right groups apart from online interactions. Pantucci argues that: “while appearing to carry out their actions alone and without any physical outside instigation, in fact demonstrate some level of contact with operational extremists”[57]

Another challenge in the profiling of Right-wing terrorists, is ideological pointwise, not all of the perpetrators share the same ideology; studies that focus on forms of far-right violence identify a heterogeneous viewpoint that is considered to be as “far-right”, the range of this presents a challenge in the identification of the possible terrorists; ranging from neo-Nazi anti-Semitic to white supremacist ideals to Islamophobia.[58] Far-right ideologies and cultures have become transnational.[59] A study from Ramon Spaaij suggests that: “ideology provides lone actors with a crucial sense of moral authority that allows them to believe they are engaging in violence as a way to confront an enemy they believe to be morally corrupt.”[60]

Jackson arguments that exposure and interest in far-right ideology is one part of what can be identified as being crucial to producing far-right lone actor terrorists.[61] As exposed before radicalisation is a process that occurs over time. Nevertheless, identifying people already on the process of radicalisation before they have committed any serious crime is challenging, especially in the lone actor category; according to Jackson: “Each case of far-right lone actor terrorism presents a unique mix of such distal and proximate factors, and often it is only after an attack that these can be seen as explanatory for the radicalisation of an individual.”[62]

The identification of common issues is what could help with the profiling of such individuals, Paul Gill’s research show that regularly occurring factors can include: previous criminality; ongoing social isolation; and a history of mental illness, however this is too broad, therefore, Gill argues that the way of these distal and proximate factors interact, in the context of exposure to an ideology can create situations where people become more likely to engage in self-radicalization.[63] Another study by Gill et all, revealed that the common characteristics that the attackers have is that:1) the average age of perpetrators was 36.3 years, 2) 50% of perpetrators were unemployed, 3) 50% had previous criminal convictions, 4) 27.5% had been in prison, 5) 47.5% of perpetrators had recently joined a group; 6) 52% verbalised [64] their intent to others, such as friends or family; 7) 10% relied on other people to help procure weapons; 8) 17.5% carried out dry runs of their intended attack; 9)17.5% gave prior warning of their attack; 10) 37.5% used online sources to prepare the attack and; 11) 35% of the perpetrators reportedly suffered from some kind of mental health disorder (the estimated percentage of such disorders for the general population is 27%).[65] [66] [67] [68]

 

6.Conclusions

Right-wing terrorism refers to the use of terrorist violence by right-wing groups who pursue the idea that a certain group of people sharing a common element (nation, race, culture) is superior and has to rule over the rest of the society. The main challenges on discerning terrorism and hate crimes is that, they there’s no clear distinction between them, I argue that the main differences between them are: 1) planification and 2) ideology and I argue that hate crimes come before terrorism, and serves as a bridge and as an ideological testing phase; once the individual or group has committed a violent act, he/they are motivated to scale the violence, thus planning and premeditating an attack in order to induce fear, which then can be considered terrorism

In sum, the key elements to be found in the Right-wing terrorist attacks are: the majority of attacks and killings have been committed by unorganized gangs and lone actors; they target mostly immigrants and; they resort to knives and beatings rather than firebombs and firearms. However, this tendency is changing, given that the last terrorist attacks were done with firearms, such as the attack in New Zealand and Germany. In the profiling part, there is no clearly discernible profile of a lone actor terrorist, apart from the fact that they are almost universally white and male, there are few shared characteristics shared by all far-right lone actors; however, the study shows that besides being white and male is that they are most likely to be unemployed, a record of crime, previous demonstrations of hate crimes, acted individual, self-radicalized on the internet and, has some type of mental disorder. Finally, the trend of the “lone wolf” is misused since they don’t necessarily are alone, but rather that the individual acts individually.

 

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• (2018). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.
• Frank Neubacher, Fremdenfeindliche Brandanschläge. Eine kriminologisch-empirische Untersuchuchng von Tätern, Tathintergründen und gerichtlicher Verarbeitung in Jugendstrafverfahren, (Godesberg: Forum, 1998): 48-49.
• Aaaslan., & T. Bjorgo. (2018). Investigating Terrorism from the Extreme Right: A Review of Past and Present Research 2018. PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 12, Issues 6.
• Jackson, P. (2018). BEYOND THE ‘LONE WOLF’: LONE ACTOR TERRORISM AND THE FAR-RIGHT IN EUROPE. in Kallis, S. Zeiger & Ozturk VIOLENT RADICALISATION & FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM IN EUROPE (p. 37-94). SETA Publications.
• James Jacobs and Kimberly Potter, Hate crimes: criminal law & identity politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
• Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2016), accessed 11 August, 2017, http://www. strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/CLAT-Series-5-Policy-Paper-1-ICCT.pdf.
• Kathleen Deloughery, Ryan King, and Victor Asal, “Close Cousins or Distant Relatives? The Relationship Between Terrorism and Hate Crime,” Crime & Delinquency 58, no. 5 (2012). <http://cad. sagepub.com/content/58/5/663.abstract>; Colleen Mills, Joshua Freilich, and Steven Chermak, “Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine Whether They Are ‘Close Cousins’ or ‘Distant Relatives,’” Crime & Delinquency (2015). <http://cad.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/ 12/18/0011128715620626.abstract>.
• Koehler, “Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century.” Routledge, Series on Fascism and the Far-Right, in print (2016).
• Koehler, D. (2016). Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe: Current Developments and Issues for the Future. PRISM, Vol 6, No. 2, 84-105.
• Koehler, D. (2019). Violence and Terrorism from the Far- Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague.
• Manus I. Midlarsky, Origins of Political Extremism: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond (Cambridge: University Press, 2011), p. 7.
• Mark Hamm, American skinheads: the criminology and control of hate crime (Westport, Conn.: Praege, 1993)
• Michelle Mark, “Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Have Spiked After Every Major Terrorist Attack: After Paris, Muslims Speak Out Against Islamophobia,” International Business Times, November 18, 2015, <http://www.ibtimes.com/anti-muslim-hate-crimes- have-spiked-after-every-major-terrorist-attack-after- paris-2190150>.
• Muro, H. J. (2018). Realidad, ideología y terminología: entre la radicalización, la violencia política y el terrorismo yihadista. Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional, Vol. 4, No. 2.order and Terrorist Involvement,” American Psychologist 72, no. 3 (2017), 231 – 241.
• Pantucci, R. et al., “Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review”, Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 1 (2015), p. 2.
• Paul Gill, John Horgan and Paige Deckert, “Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motiva- tions and Antecedent Behavior of Lone-Actor Terrorists,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 59, no. 2 (2014), 425 – 435.
• Raffaello Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Isla- mist Terrorists (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Po- litical Violence, 2011), accessed 11 August, 2017, http://icsr.info/wp-content/up- loads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf.
• Randy Blazak, “Isn’t Every Crime a Hate Crime? The Case for Hate Crime Laws,” Sociology Compass 5, no. 4 (2011): 245.
• Ravndal, J. A. (2016). Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset. Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 10, Issue 3.
• Rogers, Paul. 2013. «Terrorism. » in Security Studies, An introduction, de Paul D. Williams, 171-184. Routledge.
• Schmid, A. P. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague.
• Schuurmann, B., & M. T. (2018). Reconsidering Radicalization: Fanaticism and the Link Between Ideas and Violence 2018. Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 12, Issue 1.
• Sinai, Joshua. 2009. «How to Define Terrorism. » Perspectives on Terrorism 9-11.
• Spain Sánchez ‘attack plot’: Police arrest gun suspect,” BBC News, November 8, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46138158
• Vikram Dodd, “Two men arrested in London on suspicion of far-right terrorism plot,” The Guardian, November 2, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/nov/02/two-men-arrested-london-on-suspicion-of-plotting-terror- attacks?CMP=share_btn_tw

[1] Spain Sánchez ‘attack plot’: Police arrest gun suspect,” BBC News, November 8, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46138158

[2] Emmanuel Jarry, “France arrests six over plot to attack Macron: official,” Reuters, November 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-security/france-arrests-six-over-plot-to-attack-macron-official- idUSKCN1NB1KX 4

[3] Vikram Dodd, “Two men arrested in London on suspicion of far-right terrorism plot,” The Guardian, November 2, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/nov/02/two-men-arrested-london-on-suspicion-of-plotting-terror- attacks?CMP=share_btn_tw

[4] Kathleen Deloughery, Ryan King, and Victor Asal, “Close Cousins or Distant Relatives? The Relationship Between Terrorism and Hate Crime,” Crime & Delinquency 58, no. 5 (2012). <http://cad. sagepub.com/content/58/5/663.abstract>; Colleen Mills, Joshua Freilich, and Steven Chermak, “Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine Whether They Are ‘Close Cousins’ or ‘Distant Relatives,’” Crime & Delinquency (2015). <http://cad.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/ 12/18/0011128715620626.abstract>.

[5] Angelique Chrisafis, “Front National Wins Opening Round in France’s Regional Elections,” The Guardian, December 7, 2015. <http://www.theguard- ian.com/world/2015/dec/06/front-national-wins- opening-round-in-frances-regional-elections>.

[6] Michelle Mark, “Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Have Spiked After Every Major Terrorist Attack: After Paris, Muslims Speak Out Against Islamophobia,” International Business Times, November 18, 2015, <http://www.ibtimes.com/anti-muslim-hate-crimes- have-spiked-after-every-major-terrorist-attack-after- paris-2190150>.

[7] Frank Neubacher, Fremdenfeindliche Brandanschläge. Eine kriminologisch-empirische Untersuchuchng von Tätern, Tathintergründen und gerichtlicher Verarbeitung in Jugendstrafverfahren, (Godesberg: Forum, 1998): 48-49.

[8] James Jacobs and Kimberly Potter, Hate crimes: criminal law & identity politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[9] Ravndal, J. A. (2016). Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset. Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 10, Issue 3.

[10] EUROPOL. (2018). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.

[11]Koehler, D. (2016). Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe: Current Developments and Issues for the Future. PRISM, Vol 6, No. 2, 84-105.

[12] Koehler, D. (2019). Violence and Terrorism from the Far- Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague.

[13] Sinai, Joshua. 2009. «How to Define Terrorism. » Perspectives on Terrorism 9-11.

[14] Ibidem

[15] Rogers, Paul. 2013. «Terrorism. » in Security Studies, An introduction, de Paul D. Williams, 171-184. Routledge.

[16] Ibidem

[17] Ibidem

[18] Mark Hamm, American skinheads: the criminology and control of hate crime (Westport, Conn.: Praege, 1993)

[19] “One could therefore consider an attack as extreme-right terrorism if the target selection is (1) premised on extreme right ideas, (2) the attack is premeditated, and (3) the violence is intended to trigger psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target. On the other hand, extreme-right violence does not require premeditation, and includes all violent attacks whose target selection is premised on extreme right ideas.”

[20] Koehler, D. (2016). Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe: Current Developments and Issues for the Future. PRISM, Vol 6, No. 2, 84-105.

[21] Ibidem

[22] Koehler, D. (2019). Violence and Terrorism from the Far- Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague

[23] Ibidem

[24] Koehler, “Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century.” Routledge, Series on Fascism and the Far-Right, in print (2016).

[25] Ibidem

[26] Mark Hamm, American skinheads: the criminology and control of hate crime (Westport, Conn.: Praege, 1993)

[27] Randy Blazak, “Isn’t Every Crime a Hate Crime? The Case for Hate Crime Laws,” Sociology Compass 5, no. 4 (2011): 245.

[28] Donald Green, Laurence McFalls, and Jennifer Smith, “Hate Crime: An Emergent Research Agenda,” Annual Review of Sociology 27, (2001): 435.

[29] Chermak, “Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine Whether They Are ‘Close Cousins’ or ‘Distant Relatives,’ Crime & Delinquency (2015), <http://cad.sagepub.com/ content/early/2015/12/18/0011128715620626. abstract>.

[30] EUROPOL. (2018). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.

2018. Aasland, & T. Bjorgo (2018). Investigating Terrorism from the Extreme Right: A Review of Past and Present Research 2018. PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 12, Issues 6.

[31] Astrid Bötticher & Miroslav Mares, Extremismus. Theorien – Konzepte – Formen, (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012), pp. 54-58

[32] Lemma ‘Extremismus’ in Dieter Nohlen et al. Lexikon der Politik. Band 7: Politische Begriffe (München: C.H. Beck, 1998), pp. 172-73.

[33] Schuurmann, B., & M. T. (2018). Reconsidering Radicalization: Fanaticism and the Link Between Ideas and Violence 2018. Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 12, Issue 1.

[34] Ibidem

[35] Doosje, B., Moghaddam, F., Kruglanski, a., de Wolf, A., Mann, L., & Feddes, A. (2016). Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization. Current Opinion in Psychology , 79-84.

[36] ibidem

[37] PET, Danish Intelligence Services, 2009. See also COT, Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy (The Hague: COT, 17 November 2008), p. 13.

[38] Swedish Security Service, ’Radikalisering och avradikalisering’, 2009; see also, Magnus Ranstorp, Preventing Violent Radicalisation and Terrorism. The Case of Indonesia (Stockholm: Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies 2009), p. 2.

[39] Manus I. Midlarsky, Origins of Political Extremism: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond (Cambridge: University Press, 2011), p. 7.

[40] Schmid, A. P. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague.

[41] Ibidem

[42] Aubrey, Stefan M. (2004). The New Dimension of International Terrorism. vdf Hochschulverlag AG. p. 45

[43] Schmid, A. P. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague.

[44] ibidem

[45] ibidem

[46] Jackson, P. (2018). BEYOND THE ‘LONE WOLF’: LONE ACTOR TERRORISM AND THE FAR-RIGHT IN EUROPE. Kallis, S. Zeiger & Ozturk VIOLENT RADICALISATION & FAR-RIGHT

[47] J. Aasland, & T. Bjorgo. (2018). Investigating Terrorism from the Extreme Right: A Review of Past and Present Research 2018. PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 12, Issues 6.

[48]Ibidem

[49]Ibidem

[50]Ibidem

[51] Raffaello Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Isla- mist Terrorists (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011), accessed 11 August, 2017, http://icsr.info/wp-content/up- loads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf.

[52] Clare Ellis and Raffaello Pantucci, “Leakage” and Interaction with Authorities (London: Royal United Service Institute, 2016), accessed 11 August, 2017, https://rusi. org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_4.pdf.

[53] E. Bakker, & B. de Graaf(2011). Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: some CT Approaches Addressed. PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 5, Issues 5-6, 43-50.

[54] Pantucci, R. et al., “Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review”, Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 1 (2015), p. 2.

[55] Bakker, E., “Lone-Actor Terrorism, Policy Paper 1: Personal characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists”, Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 5, p. 4.

[56] For example, David Wilson, “Was He a Lone Wolf Seeking Moment of Fame?” Mail on Sunday, 19 June, 2016; and Lucy Thornton and Nick Sommerlad, “Rise of the ‘Lone Wolf’ Extremist Feared After Thomas Mair’s Murder of Jo Cox,” Daily Mirror, 23 November, 2016.

[57] Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves, 19.

[58] Paul Jackson, “Surveying the ‘Far Right’ in Europe: Reflections on Recent Trends and Conceptual Approaches,” European Yearbook of Minority Issues 13 (2016), 31 – 57.

[59] Andrea Mammone, Emmanuelle Godin and Brian Jenkins, eds., Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe (London, Routledge, 2013); Paul Jackson and Anton Shekhovtsov, eds., The Post-War Anglo-American Far Right (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2014)

[60] Ramon Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention (London: Springer, 2011), 61.

[61] Jackson, P. (2018). BEYOND THE ‘LONE WOLF’: LONE ACTOR TERRORISM AND THE FAR-RIGHT IN EUROPE. In Kallis, S. Zeiger & Ozturk VIOLENT RADICALISATION & FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM IN EUROPE (p. 37-94). SETA Publications.

[62] Ibidem

[63] Paul Gill, John Horgan and Paige Deckert, “Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behavior of Lone-Actor Terrorists,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 59, no. 2 (2014), 425 – 435.

[64] Paul Gill, John Horgan and Paige Deckert, “Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behavior of Lone-Actor Terrorists,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 59, no. 2 (2014), 425 – 435.

[65] Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2016), accessed 11 August, 2017, http://www. strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/CLAT-Series-5-Policy-Paper-1-ICCT.pdf.

[66] Gill et al., Bombing Alone.

[67] Paul Gill and Emily Conner, “There and Back Again: The Study of Mental Dis-

order and Terrorist Involvement,” American Psychologist 72, no. 3 (2017), 231 – 241.

[68] Jackson, P. (2018). BEYOND THE ‘LONE WOLF’: LONE ACTOR TERRORISM AND THE FAR-RIGHT IN EUROPE. In Kallis, S. Zeiger & Ozturk, VIOLENT RADICALISATION & FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM IN EUROPE (p. 37-94). SETA Publications.